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Risk in the Balance
JAY D. WExLER

Risk versus Risk Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment.
Cambridge:
Edited by John D. Graham* and Jonathan Baert Wiener.

Harvard University Press, 1995. 337 pp. $39.95.
In both academic and legislative circles, risk assessment reform is
currently a hot topic.

In the last decade, scholars have increasingly

criticized the risk assessment procedures which administrative agencies
employ to protect the public from environmental and health risks.

Critics have pointed to several flaws in the current system, calling it
4
inconsistent,' undemocratic, 2 overly decentralized, 3 excessively rigid,

* Lanv Clerk to the Honorable David S. Tatel, US. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
1997-98. ID. Stanford Law School, 1997; 111.4. University of Chicago, 1994; BA. Harvard
University, 1991. Many thanks to Robert Rabin for his helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this review, and to Theresa lWaugh and the staff at the Connecticut Lai Review for their
hard work and many excellent suggestions.
** Professor of Policy and Decision Sciences at the HarvardSchool of Public Health and
Director, Harvard Center for Risk Analysis.
*** Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Environment, Duke Universlt
1. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFEcnvE RISK

REGULATION 21-29 (1993) (noting that agencies use different methods for estimating the cffects
of regulations; that the values regulators attach to the saving of a statistical life vary among
agencies; that regulators ignore one program's safety effects on other programs; and that regulating small risks can cause countervailing risks).
2. See, e.g., Daniel Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical Review, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 501, 501-02 (1989) (arguing that the nation faces a "participatory dilemma, in which people's expectations about their capacity to influence decisions are not
matched by political and institutional realities").
3. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 22 (suggesting the need for interprogram coordination).
4. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State,
48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 260-61 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, ConstitutionalMoments] (arguing that
"[g]ovemment should favor flexible, market-based incentives rather than rigid commands").
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and unjustifiably conservative.5 To deal with these problems, scholars
have proposed a variety of solutions. Peter Huber has urged agencies
to assess risk less conservatively in order to save society from "second
best" technology.6 Cass Sunstein and Richard Pildes have proposed

injecting public participation in the risk assessment process as a way of

"reinventing the regulatory state." 7 And Justice Breyer has
advocated

establishing a specially-trained cadre of civil servants to help break the
"vicious circle" of risk assessment failure.8 Legislators too have begun
to take steps to reform the regulatory process. The 104th Congress
recently debated. several proposals which would have significantly
amended the Administrative Procedure Act9 to require, among other
things, mandated cost-benefit analysis and increased judicial review of
agency regulations."0 Though Congress ultimately failed to pass any
revolutionary legislation, it seems clear that such legislation is not far

off and that America is truly on the verge of becoming "a genuinely
post-New Deal regulatory state."'

One of the recurring themes in the current critique of the American

risk assessment process is that the system fails to account for counter-

vailing risks.' 2

Regulations often result in unintended consequences

5. See Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The RisAy
Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 295, 298-300 (1995) (reviewing ADVANCES

IN APPLIED MICRO-ECONOMICS

RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE VALUATION

OF BENEFITS AND COSTS (V. Kerry Smith ed., 1986)) (noting that many critics of the current

risk assessment system believe that "risk assessment systematically overestimates the magnitude
of environmental problems by using conservative measures of risk, leading directly to over-rcgulation and fueling public paranoia").
6. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management
in the Courts, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 277, 332-35 (1985) [hereinafter Huber, Second Best] ("Even
in the agencies, comparative risk regulation is not all that it should be. But there are, at least,
some promising signs here."). Huber is particularly critical of the role of courts in the risk
assessment phenomenon. According to Huber, courts simply cannot adequately regulate public
risks, and their refusal to defer to agency decisions regarding these risks has "spawned a neverending cycle of truly perverse risk-regulatory decisions." Id.at 333.
7. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 75 (1995).
8. BREYER, supra note 1,at 59-61.

9. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 3105, 3344 (1996).
10. See, e.g., S.291, 104th Cong. (1995); S.343, 104th Cong. (1995). For an excellent
discussion of the debate over these bills, see Sunstein, Constitutional Moments, supra note 4, at
277-82.
11. Sunstein, Constitutional Moments, supra note 4, at 249 (arguing that America is moving
away from the New Deal paradigm and towards becoming a "cost-benefit state").
12. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 1, at 11-16; AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY

48-50 (1988); Sunstein, Constitutional Moments, supra note 4, at 261-62; Cass R. Sunstein,
Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1533, 1535-36 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein,
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which in many cases are far worse than the original risk. For example, removing asbestos from schools may harm removal workers far
more than it would have harmed children were it left alone." Holding
vaccine manufacturers liable for rare injuries to children may cause
manufacturers to exit the market and leave children without any protection from disease.' 4 Using cloth diapers instead of disposable diapers
in order to reduce solid landfill waste may increase air pollution because cloth diapers require energy-intensive washing.' 5 Decreasing
cigarette advertising on television may in fact increase smoking by
decreasing competition among tobacco firms or by eliminating otherwise required anti-smoking ads. 6 Because of the myopia of the current
regulatory system, agencies often do not even consider countervailing
risks when developing their regulatory programs.' Despite the fact that
this pervasive problem has attracted the attention of many scholars, 8
until the publication of Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting the
Health and Environment,9 the literature severely lacked a fully developed account of the problem.
In Risk versus Risk, editors John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert
Wiener have put together the first comprehensive treatment of the risk
tradeoff phenomenon. The book proceeds in three parts. In the first
chapter, Graham and Wiener set out the problem of risk tradeoffs, examining the different ways that these tradeoffs can manifest themselves,20 arguing that the ubiquitous problem is severely hampering the
nation's risk reduction campaign,' and suggesting some initial ideas for
Health-Health Tradeoffs].
13. See BREYER, supra note I, at 12.
14. See PErR W. HUBER, LLABIUTY: THE LEGAL RE'ol~rm

ON AND ns CoNsEquENcEs

166-67 (1988) [hereinafter HUBER, LuABITY].
15. See John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, In RISK
VERSUS RisH: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONWENT 1, 13 (John D.

Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) (citing Patricia Poore, Disposable Diapers are
O.K: The Real World, GARBAGE, Oct/Nov. 1992, at 27-31).
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L Rv. 407, 429
(1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Paradoxes].

17. See Sunstein, Constitutional Moments, supra note 4, at 261 (rUnder the existing regulatory system, there is no systematic way to ensure that [countervailing] consequences receive
attention.").
18. See supra note 12.
19. RISK VERSUS RIsK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRO MENT (John
D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) [hereinafter RISK VERSUS RISK].

20. The authors suggest a four-category typology for understanding risk tradeoffs. See Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at 22-25. For a brief discussion of the typology, see Infra
notes 37-40 and accompanying text.

21. See Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at 11-12 ("Unfortunately, there are reasons to be-
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solving the problem.22 The next nine chapters are case studies, written
by various risk assessment experts, which address the problem of risk
tradeoffs from a variety of angles and suggest the complexity of the
issues.2" Finally, the closing chapter, also authored by Graham and
Wiener, explains the problems which underlie the regulatory state and
subsequently give rise to the risk tradeoff phenomenon. This chapter
also proposes institutional reforms to solve the tradeoff problem.24
Risk versus Risk is a much-needed, comprehensive, sophisticated,
and persuasive account of a very important problem plaguing the American regulatory state. The introduction provided in the first chapter is
straightforward and compelling, and the case studies which illustrate the
contours of the tradeoff phenomenon are both illuminating and entertaining (the chapter by Paul Anderson and Jonathan Baert Wiener on
the benefits of eating fish rather than meat is particularly fascinating).25
The proposals suggested by Graham and Wiener in their final chapter
are also satisfying, if not quite as impressive as the earlier chapters.
On the whole, the book leaves the impression that the risk tradeoff
predicament is so important and obvious that it is hard to imagine it
has yet to be solved.
However, in many ways, Risk, versus Risk leaves the reader with
more questions than answers. Though the authors26 do an excellent job
of introducing the problem of risk tradeoffs, they ironically fail to submit
their reform proposals to a rigorous risk tradeoff analysis of their own.
While the authors certainly recognize the potential difficulties with implementing a comprehensive program of risk tradeoff analysis that would
require substantial changes in the behavior of all three branches of government, they do not explore these pitfalls in much depth. Therefore,
the authors cannot weigh the pitfalls against the benefits of their propos-

lieve that the prospect of risk tradeoffs is growing.").

22. See id.at 29-41 (discussing the characteristics of risks that managers must consider and
advocating adopting risk-superior moves to reduce overall risk).

23. See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the book's case studies.
24. See Jonathan Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VER-

SUS RISK, supra note 15, at 226-71.

These reforms include amending statutes to require risk

tradeoff analysis, integrating agencies so they can better perform such analyses, and authorizing

courts to broaden judicial review in order to ensure that agencies actually perform risk tradeoff
analysis thoughtfully and rigorously.
25. See Paul D. Anderson & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Eating Fish, in RISK VERSUS RISK,
supra note 15, at 104-23.
26. I refer to Graham and Wiener when I use the term "authors." Although they are in fact

the editors of the book, they author the opening and closing chapters, which constitute the primary analysis of the risk tradeoff problem, and which are the primary focus of this review.
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als to argue their affirmative case for a broad-based risk tradeoff analysis
program with complete persuasiveness.
This problem occurs in three primary areas. First, though the authors recognize that the costs of examining risks of decreasing importance will at some point begin to outweigh the marginal benefits of
weighing those risks,2" the authors do not propose any institutional safeguards to ensure that agencies will stop weighing risks before they
reach this point. This problem, referred to by the authors as the "rippie" 28 problem, is a fundamental one which the authors unfortunately
fail to examine in much detail. Second, although the authors recognize
that many risk assessment decisions involve sensitive questions of moral
and ethical values,29 they fail to propose any institutional changes which
will ensure that the risk assessment process becomes more democratic.
The authors, therefore, propose a system which requires the input of
popular values but which provides no mechanism for this input. Third,
though the authors recognize the dangers of broadening judicial review
of agency decisions on risk management, ° they nevertheless instill in
the courts a far greater power of judicial review than courts currently
possess. The authors recommend this authority without rigorously assessing whether the costs of such increased review, in the form of
increased delay, litigation, and transaction costs, are worth the benefits
that increased review would provide. All this is not to say that a risk
tradeoff analysis program such as that proposed by Graham and Wiener
should not be implemented. Rather, it suggests that the authors need to
answer some serious remaining questions before the precise contours of
such a program can be ascertained.
This review proceeds in two parts. Part I lays out the argument of
Risk versus Risk and contends that, for the most part, the authors make
a persuasive case for implementing a comprehensive risk tradeoff analysis

27. See Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at 21-22; Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at
228.
28. See Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at 20 ("Urging that decisionmakers employ RTA
nonetheless obliges us to articulate some way to judge which countervailing risks are worthy of
concern: how many ripples in the pool should analysts investigate?").
29. See id at 33-36 (noting that individuals will perceive different risks differently, depending on a variety of individual factors and arguing that particularly sensitive ethical questions
arise when risk management solutions shift risks to populations which were not initially represented in the deliberations regarding the risk management decision).
30. See Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 260 (citing Richard B. Stewart, The Rote of
Courts in Risk Management, 16 ENVrL L. REP. 10208 (1986)) ("The courts have not, however,

been a reliable source of leadership for more intelligent management of society's risk portfolio.").
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program. Part II argues that the book fails to analyze in sufficient depth
the most important potential problems with such a program. Sections A,
B, and C of Part II deal with the questions of ripples, values, and courts,
respectively. Finally, the review concludes with some brief thoughts
about how a slightly altered version of Graham and Wiener's system
might be the best solution.
I.

THE BENEFITS OF RISK TRADEOFF ANALYSIS

A. Assessing and Solving Risk Tradeoffs
The central contention of Risk versus Risk is that the failure of risk
managers to consider risk tradeoffs is undermining the nation's otherwise largely successful campaign against risk.3' This failure to consider
tradeoffs allegedly prevents risk managers from reducing overall risk
and threatens the credibility of the entire movement to decrease risk. 2
Moreover, the authors suggest that the problem is growing, not only
because society has solved many of the most preventable risks-thereby
increasing the importance of countervailing risks relative to target
risks-but also because attempting to tackle risks arising out of more
complex systems, such as the global environment, makes it more likely
that countervailing risks will arise. 3 The authors concede that there is
no way to quantify the exact damage that risk tradeoffs have caused,34
but they offer a multitude of examples from "historical experience" to
support their claim that tradeoffs are "ubiquitous." '
In perhaps the
most striking portion of the book, the authors provide a vivid set of
examples from a variety of risk contexts to demonstrate their point.
We learn that: hospital care can cause illnesses, pollution control often
merely shifts risks from one medium to another, banning certain fungicides for fear of cancer actually causes a cancer-causing fungus to grow
on grains, child safety caps cause a net increase in child poisonings,
and a ban on ocean dumping may cause disposal of industrial wastes

31. See Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at 10 ("Despite the record of successes (and
some failures) in reducing risks, we suspect that risk tradeoffs are quietly hindering the effectiveness of the national campaign to reduce risk.").
32. See id. at 1I.
33. See id. at 10.
34. See id. at 11.
35. See id.at 12-17.
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on land much closer to human populations and fragile ecosystems."
To conceptualize the problem of risk tradeoffs, the authors provide
a four-part typology for understanding the different types of tradeoffs
caused by regulation."
A "risk offset" occurs when a regulation
causes the same adverse outcome it was intending to prevent in the
same population that it was supposed to protect. The fungicide problem is an example of a risk offset: a regulation meant to protect consumers of grains from cancer through removal of a carcinogenic fungicide that actually exposes consumers to carcinogens when the cancercausing fungus grows on the unprotected grain. A "risk substitution"
occurs when a different risk is imposed upon the target population.
For example, chlorinating water to protect water drinkers may prevent
water-borne diseases but might also simultaneously increase long-term
cancer risks in the target population." A "risk transfer" involves the
shifting of the target risk from the target population to some other
population. For example, increasing regulations on the tobacco industry in the United States has caused tobacco companies to focus on
sales abroad, thereby causing increased risks from smoking in foreign
countries." Finally, a "risk transformation" occurs when a regulation
intended to decrease one risk to a target population actually imposes a
different type of risk upon a different population. For example, banning certain pesticides to protect wildlife may increase risks to farmers
who must handle a more toxic substitute.40
It is important to realize that any particular regulation could cause

36. See id
37. See i, at 22-25.
38. See Susan W. Putnam & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Seeking Safe Drinking IJater, in RISK
VERSUS RISK, supra note 15, at 124. Risk substitutions often occur with medicine side effects. One example is accutane, which is a wonder drug for acne but which causes birth defects in the children of pregnant women (though if the harm is understood as afflicting the
child rather than the mother, the tradeoff might be characterized as a transfonnation rather
than a substitution). See also Marjorie Sun, Anti-Acne Drug Poses Dilemma for FDA, 240
SCIeCE 714, 714-15 (1988). Another example of risk substitution occurs when banning certain carcinogenic chemicals encourages increased use of chemicals which arc not carcinogenic
but which cause, for example, reproductive harms. See Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at
25.
39. Currently, American tobacco companies are looking to Asia, and particularly China, to
increase sales. Anti-smoking forces are also making efforts abroad to decrease the companies'
success. See Glenn Frankel, How Tobacco Firm and U.S. Broke Dorn Barriers to East:
Embattled at Home, Industry Gets Boost From IVashington, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 18,
1996, at 1; Glenn Frankel & Steven Mufson, Past China Market Key to Smoking Disputes,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 20, 1996, at Al.
40. See Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at 25.
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one or more of these effects. For example, tobacco regulations might
cause both a risk transfer and a risk offset if bans on television ads do

in fact save money for tobacco companies. 4 Such regulations might
also result in a risk substitution or risk transformation if, for example,
higher cigarette taxes cause lower-income smokers to spend less of

their income on food and other necessities for themselves and their
families.
In the opening chapter, the authors recommend that decision-makers
employ a three-part risk tradeoff analysis ("RTA") to solve these prob-

lems. They suggest that risk managers first employ the typology to understand the tradeoffs that might result from an intervention.

2

Second,

risk managers should analyze a set of factors provided by RTA for
weighing risks and selecting among them. These factors include the
probability .of risk,43 the size of the population,44 certainty in risk esti-

mates,4" type of adverse outcome,46 distributional concerns,47 and the timing of risks.4"

Finally, through effort, ingenuity, advanced technology,

41. See supra text accompanying note 16.
42. See Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at 19.
43. See id, at 30. In other words, it is important to recognize the difference between a risk
that causes a I in 100 risk of death and one that has a lifetime mortality probability of I in
100,000. When the adverse outcomes of two different risks are the same, "the relative probabilities of the adverse outcomes become critical." Id. at 31.
44. See id. at 31. Analyzing this factor ensures that risk managers will not implement regulations that will decrease risk to a small population but transfer or transform it to a much larger
population. See id. (citation omitted).
45. See id. at 31-32 ("Estimates of risk are often uncertain because of gaps in scientific
knowledge. Hence, consideration needs to be given to the scientific basis or credibility of the
target and countervailing risks. Some risk estimates are amply supported by science, while others
are supported only by speculation.").
46. See id. at 32-34. The authors are very careful to emphasize that personal perception of
risk may be important in making risk tradeoff choices. For example, research has shown that
people prefer voluntary risks to involuntary ones and dread certain risks, such as cancer, more
than others. See id. at 33-34 (citing Paul Slovic, Beyond Numbers: A Broader Perspective on
Risk Perception and Risk Communication, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN
RISK MANAGEMENT 48, 56 (Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander eds., 1991)). The authors realize that decisionmakers should take these differences into account when making choices
if the differences are based on true value differences and not ignorance of risk. See Id. at 34.
47. See id. at 34-36. The authors make it clear that risk managers should be concerned with
who incurs the risks. "When risks are unequally distributed among the population, they may be
perceived as more onerous than when risks are distributed equally. Moreover, risks that are incurred disproportionately by disadvantaged groups in society may be perceived as less fair than
risks that are incurred by all groups in society." Id. at 34. These distributional concerns raise
sensitive ethical issues that must be considered in the RTA process. See id at 34-35.
48. See id. at 36. In other words, risks that will manifest themselves in adverse outcomes
far in the future should be weighed differently than those which cause more immediate harms.
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and sustained attention to important risk factors, risk managers should be
able to design methods for reducing both target and countervailing risks.
These "risk superior" moves will enable the nation to optimize its campaign to decrease overall risk.49
The nine case studies which form the heart of the book vividly illustrate the problems raised by the opening chapter. They range in subject
matter from the basic issue of drug side effects, discussed by Evridiki
Hatziandreu, Constance Williams, and John Graham in their chapter on
"Estrogen Therapy for Menopause,"5' to the extremely complex issues
raised by policies aimed at decreasing global warming and ozone depletion discussed by Jonathan Baert Wiener in his chapter on "Protecting
the Global Environment."5'
Each case study raises at least one unique issue in risk tradeoff analysis. For example, Miriam E. Adams, Howard Chang and Howard S.
2 suggests
Frazier's chapter on "Clozapine Therapy for Schizophrenia""
that risk managers should consider not only whether regulations increase
total lives saved but also whether they increase net quality of life for the
affected population.53 Susan W. Putnam and Jonathan Baert Wiener's
chapter on "Seeking Safe Drinking Water'" makes the important point
that Americans cannot expect and should not demand zero risk, even
from an ubiquitous source of sustenance such as the nation's water supply.5" The chapter also clearly illustrates the importance of subjective,
value-based decision-making in risk management. Although there may
be risk-superior alternatives to chlorine which are not as carcinogenic,
these alternatives are costly and may therefore impose a "not trivial"56
burden on lower income communities.

49. See id at 36-41.
0
50. See Evridiki Hatziandreu et al., Estrogen Therapy for Menopause, In RISK VERSUS RISK,
supra note 15, at 42 (discussing the costs and benefits of using estrogen therapy, which is carci-

nogenic, to treat postmenopausal decline in estrogen in women, a condition which increases women's risk of osteoporosis and heart disease).
51. See
supra note
52. See
supra note

Jonathan Baert Wiener, Protecting the Global Environment, In RISK VERSUS RISK,
15, at 193.
Miriam E. Adams et al., Clozapine Therapyfor Schbfophrenla, in RISK VERSUS RISK,
15, at 53.

53. See id at 71 ("Quality-of-life measures are not explicitly and formally used in the FDA's
drug approval process, although they may be considered to some extent in the definitions of
efficiency and safety. For devastating chronic diseases such as schizophrenia, mortality and morbidity appear to be incomplete measures of effectiveness."). For more on quality of life analysis,
see Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 83-85.

54. See Putnam & Wiener, supra note 38, at 124.
55. See Id at 146.

56. See id at 144.
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Other chapters drive home the "values" point as well. Katherine
Walker and Jonathan Baert Wiener's chapter on "Recycling Lead"' 7 notes
that the EPA's debate over whether to recycle lead batteries (recycling
causes lung disease from airborne lead particles) was troubling because

the agency did not consider the effects of its decisions on children in
Likewise, Constance Williams and John Graham's
foreign countries."
chapter on "Licensing the Elderly Driver"59 discusses whether the NHTSA
should limit elderly driving, a decision which could impose substantial
health and quality of life risks upon America's aging population. This
raises the ethical issue of whether government may allocate risks to
populations without their consent. In sum, the case studies make more
concrete the theoretical and policy issues raised in the introduction,
thereby preparing the reader to better evaluate the institutional reforms
which the authors propose in the closing chapter.
The closing chapter, entitled "Resolving Risk Tradeoffs,"'6 begins with
a discussion of why risk tradeoffs occur. The authors argue that fragmented
decision-making,"' mental blocks (or heuristics) on the part of risk managers

against treating risk holistically,' the exclusion of affected populations
from
63
risk management decisions (the "omitted voice" problem),

a bias against

57. Katherine Walker & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Recycling Lead, in RISK VERSUS RISK, supra
note 15, at 149.
58. See id. at 171-72.
59. Constance Williams & John D. Graham, Licensing the Elderly Driver, in RISK VERSUS RISK,
supra note 15, at 72.
60. Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 226-71.
61. Id. at 235-40. The authors point to several levels of fragmentation, including interagency
fragmentation, federal-state fragmentation, state-state fragmentation, and Congress-agency fragmentation.
62. See id. at 233-35. The authors argue that managers often think in "conceptual boxes"
which cause them to treat risks as separate categories without, considering effects on other risks.
See id. at 234. They also argue that managers are overly concerned with the salience of recent
crises, such as a recent airline disaster, which divert them from dealing with objectively more
important risks. See id. Finally, they argue that "[r]isk tradeoffs sometimes result from fixation
on a specific symptom," such as cancer. Id. at 235. For more on heuristics and risk management, see Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk
Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990).
63. See Wiener & Graham, supra note 24 at 230-33. The problem of "omitted voice," as the
authors call it, results because "[g]ovemment bodies . . . tend to hear a subset of interests in
part because there are costs to private parties of making themselves heard: where the consequences of a decision are concentrated on a defined group, such as industry or the raison d'etre of
an advocacy group, the incentives for that group to act will be large; but where the consequences are broadly distributed across the general public, the incentives for ordinary citizens to organize and speak will be small." Id. at 230. This, of course, is a version of the "agency capture" problem. For more on this problem and its relation to regulating health and environmental
risks, see Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1027, 1065 ("If, however, risk producers have a comparative advantage over risk consumers in
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new technology,' and behavioral responses such as risk compensation all

contribute to the pervasiveness of risk tradeoffs." To solve the problem,
Graham and Wiener propose institutional changes and urge a broad cultural

paradigm shift to support these changes.
The institutional reforms advocated by Graham and Wiener would
greatly affect all three branches of government. For the legislative
branch, the authors propose that Congress submit all of its own legislation to risk tradeoff analysis, amend the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") and other key regulatory acts to require agencies to practice
RTA, and establish a Joint House-Senate Committee on Risk to ensure

holistic decision-making.66 For the executive branch, the authors recommend the creation of an institution which would act as a "primary care
provider" to treat risks affecting the "whole patient."6' They also recommend that the President revise Executive Order 1286663 to explicitly
require RTA,69 and suggest that agencies identify, consider, and publicize
the effects of their policies on other risks, notifying potential victims of
countervailing risks in order to promote awareness and foster popular
mobilization."0 For the judicial system, Graham and Wiener propose that
courts find "arbitrary and capricious" any agency action that does not
include RTA for "important countervailing risks."' This would entail
getting the administrative ear, then agency decision making might be marred by access bias just
as judicial decision-making is.").
64. See Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 240-41. Of course, as the authors recognize,
this is Huber's point. See Peter Huber, The Old.New Dhislon In Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L
REv. 1025 (1983); Huber, Second Best, supra note 6, at 295-305.
65. See Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 24142. For example, car safety devices may
cause drivers to drive more aggressively. Well-marked crosswalks may cause pedestrians to cross
without looking both ways. See id at 241.
66. See 1& at 248-51. The Joint Committee, which would "oversee all the risk policy activities of the existing committees, striving for a holistic picture that would avoid risk tradeoffs
across programs, laws, and committee jurisdictions," is, as the authors note, the idea of Cass
Sunstein. Id at 251. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life, Nev REPUBLIC, Feb. 15, 1993.
at 36.
67. Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 257 ("This 'primary risk manager' would handle intake of new problems, analyze risks using RTA, dispatch cases to specialists as needed, and track
progress and symptoms. Agencies with specific bounded responsibilities would then act as specialists providing secondary and tertiary care.").
68. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted In 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (mandating that agencies assess the costs and benefits of a regulation before adopting it). See also
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (prohibiting
regulatory action unless the potential benefits of the regulation outweigh its costs) (revoked in
1993).
69. See Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 254-55
70. Id at 255-56.
71. Id at 262. The APA says that courts should "hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
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understanding RTA7 2to be required by statutes containing phrases such as
"unreasonable risk" and even those that specifically preclude economically based cost-benefit analysis. 3 Additionally, in order to remedy the
"omitted voice" problem, Graham and Wiener propose broadening current

standing doctrine to allow victims of countervailing risks, who ordinarily
might not have standing under the Supreme Court's "'zone of interests"
doctrine,74 to challenge agency actions that affect them.75
Finally, the authors argue that none of these structural reforms will

work without a long-term shift in our cultural understanding of risk-a
new "whole patient" paradigm under which all will agree that risk must
be treated comprehensively through integrated solutions. According to
the authors, this cultural change is not far off.76 The roots of such a
transformation can be seen in the growth of the ecological movement,
in the rise of the primary care provider in the field of medicine, and in
fundamental principles of modem social science, such as Gestalt psy-

chology.77 All of these developments have made the authors optimistic
about the possibilities of RTA, as the closing lines to the book indicate:
As our society's paradigm is changing from yesterday's fragmented, bounded approach to a more integrated, whole-patient
culture, our effort should be to fashion useful tools, like RTA,
I

findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1996).
72. Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 263. The Toxic Substances Control Act is one of
these statutes. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1994).
73. See Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 264.
74. The Court has required, as a prudential, rather than a constitutional, limit on standing in
administrative law cases, that plaintiffs seeking standing under the APA show that they arguably
fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the applicable statute. The Court first
articulated this test in Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 379 U.S. 150 (1970).
It has applied the test strictly, denying standing in several cases. See Air Courier Conf. v.
American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1991) (postal workers union had no standing to
challenge Postal Service's decision to allow a new form of competition despite its statutory
monopoly-since the monopoly statute's purpose was to give economic advantage to the Service
and not to protect postal jobs, the union was outside the zone of interests); Lujan v. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (holding affidavits indicating members' use/enjoyment of
land "in vicinity" of land covered by agency actions were insufficient to prove that their interests
were actually affected). The Court has recently shown a willingness to apply the test less
strictly, however, reversing a case in which the Ninth Circuit held that ranchers without any interest in preserving species of fish lacked standing under the ESA because they are not inside
the zone of interests established by the statute. See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997),
rev'g Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995).
75. Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 265-66.
76. Id. at 268.
77. See id. at 268-70.
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that can translate the new mind-set into practical decisions.
This experiment in pragmatism may hold the key to saving the
national campaign to reduce risk from itself.78
B. Evaluating the Argument

In large part, the authors are quite successful in demonstrating the
two central assertions of the book: (1) the phenomenon of risk tradeoff
threatens the nation's anti-risk campaign, and (2) a broad-based risk
tradeoff analysis program can solve the problem. However, certain
aspects and arguments of the book are more persuasive than others.
Particularly illuminating is the typology of risk tradeoffs that the
authors offer in the first chapter. Previous accounts of risk tradeoffs
have generally grouped together all types of tradeoff phenomena under
the same rubric.79 But, as Graham and Wiener persuasively point out,
different types of tradeoffs raise unique issues which demand different
solutions. For example, a straight risk offset, such as the issue of
whether strenuous exercise can at some point increase, rather than decrease, the risk of heart attack, raises relatively simple questions because both the target population and the type of adverse outcome involved are the same. The solution is simply one of weighing commensurate risks, and this can be done more or less objectively.
Other types of risk tradeoffs, however, raise more complex and ethically sensitive issues. Risk substitutions and risk transformations, which
both involve a change in adverse outcome, require managers to compare
two different risks-a process that requires both an objective understanding of the nature of the two risks and an appreciation for how people
value risks differently. On the other hand, both risk transfers and risk
transformations involve moving risks from one population to another,
thereby raising profoundly difficult distributional issues which cannot be
solved solely through objective means. Risk transformations involve
both issues of risk valuation and distributional concerns and are therefore
probably the most difficult tradeoffs to manage. Graham and Wiener
make an important contribution by demonstrating that the success of any
risk management reform will depend on its ability to sort through these
78. Id at 271.
79. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 1, at 11-19 (referring to them as "tunnel vision" problems); Sunstein, Constitutional Moments, supra note 4, at 261-62 (calling them all "unintended

consequences"). But see Sunstein, Health-Healdt Tradeoffs, supra note 12, at 1539-42 (suggesting framework similar to that of Graham and Wiener's).
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different types of risk tradeoffs and develop solutions specifically geared
to the needs of each.
The authors also do a particularly good job in recognizing and explaining the ethical and subjective dimensions of risk management. It has

been clear for a long time that lay people value risks differently from
experts and that any judgments about risk must take into account both
objective factors (how many lives does the risk endanger; how much will
it cost to save each life) and more subjective, context-dependent factors.

For example, scholars of risk have long known that laypeople fear catastrophic, uncontrollable, and unfamiliar risks more than subtle, familiar,
voluntary, and long-term risks."0 The authors understand this and propose
that RTA take account of these differences. At the same time, the authors
recognize that risk managers should not always incorporate popular notions

of risk in RTA because these notions are often informed by ignorance of
the true danger of various risks rather than by legitimate qualitative value
differences. 8" The case studies make this point clear. As the chapters
on menopause and water pollution demonstrate, informed value-based
differences in risk perception, such as widespread fear of cancer, are to
be respected. However, as the chapter on eating fish deftly illustrates,
fear of cancer based on a gross understanding of the likelihood of contracting the disease is not due the same respect.

80. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 57 (noting that the most salient contextual factors
include: (1)the catastrophic nature of the risk; (2) whether the risk is uncontrollable; (3) whether
the risk involves irretrievable or permanent losses; (4) the social conditions under which a particular risk is generated and managed, a point that connects to issues of consent, voluntariness, and
democratic control; (5) how equitably distributed the danger is or how concentrated on identifiable,
innocent, or traditionally disadvantaged victims, which ties to both notions of community and moral
ideals; (6) how well understood the risk process in question is, a point that bears on the psychological disturbance produced by different risks; (7) whether the risk would be faced by future generations; and (8) how familiar the risk is"). See also Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk: Reflections
on the Psychometric Paradigm, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 117, 120-25 (Sheldon Krimsky &
Dominic Golding eds., 1992).
81. On the difference between expert and lay perception of risk, both qualitative and quantitative, see Sunstein, Constitutional Moments, supra note 4, at 266. Ignorance of risk can come
about because of the heuristic devices discussed by the authors. See supra text accompanying
notes 60-70. There is also evidence that the media affects popular perceptions of risk by bringing
attention to spectacular, high profile risks while ignoring more pervasive but subtler risks. See
Kathleen Koman, Lethal Odds: Life, Death, and the Dice, HARV. MAG., SeptJOct. 1996, at 19
(quoting John Graham). There is also evidence that race and gender influence risk perception.
See id.at 19-20 (noting that women are much more likely than men to believe that something
is dangerous); see also James Flynn et al., Gender, Race, and Perception of Environmental Health
Risks, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1102 (1994) (white men view risks as more acceptable than nonwhites).
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C. The Limits of RTA
Other aspects of the book are more problematic. The most troublesome problem-that the authors do not expose their own proposed

solutions to a rigorous risk tradeoff analysis-is discussed at length
below. But there are other important problems in the exposition of the
book that also undermine the authors' ability to convince the reader
both of RTA's importance and its possibilities.

First, the authors never make it exactly clear how much risk tradeoff
analysis is already being performed, which hurts their argument for radically restructuring existing statutes and practices. The authors suggest

that the risk tradeoff problem is universal and growing,' but in several
other areas of the book, they indicate that risk managers are already

performing a great deal of RTA. For example, the authors explain that
Congress has become more aware of risk tradeoff problems and has

incorporated this awareness into new legislation.83 They also suggest that
the EPA and other federal agencies have recognized the importance of

RTA and have implemented tradeoff analysis in many areas of environmental regulation. 4 Moreover, they note that many environmental statutes already include tradeoff analysis language,

times insisted that agencies implement

RTA,86

5

that courts have at

that various Executive

Orders require some sort of tradeoff analysis,87 and that America is al-

ready in the midst of a broad-based cultural transformation in support of

82. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
83. See Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 248-49 (discussing the Clean Air Act, which requires the EPA to prepare reports on the adverse health or environmental effects of proposed
regulations, see 42 U.S.C. § 7412()(1)(C) (1995), and the Clean Water Act, which instructs the
EPA to take into account "non-water quality environmental impact7 when setting effluent limitations, see 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (b)(I)(B) (1994)).
84. See Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 252-53 (discussing, among other things, the
EPA and DOE's risk tradeoff analyses regarding global warming management).
85. Id at 263-64 (citing the Clean Water Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act as examples of statutes which already suggest some sort of RTA requirement).
86. See id at 260-61. See generally Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Transp.
Safety Ass'n, 956. F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that NHTSA was required to seriously analyze issue of whether higher fuel standards to save energy are worthw hile in light of reduced
safety resulting from smaller cars); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.
1991) (EPA must consider safety of asbestos substitutes when banning all use of asbestos).
87. See Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 254-56 (discussing Reagan and Clinton Executive Orders No. 12,291 and 12,866, respectively).
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a holistic, comprehensive attitude toward risk management."
The case studies further contribute to this ambiguity. Most of them
show that RTA is already being used-and being used successfully-to
manage risk. The two studies on drug side effects show that doctors
and health professionals do weigh the various side effects of a drug
before recommending a line of treatment. Additionally, the studies
analyzing the tradeoff between energy savings and smaller cars, between the risks of microbe infection and cancer from chlorine in the
water supply, and between recycling lead and leaving it alone, all demonstrate that RTA is currently being used effectively in many contexts.
In the face of this evidence, two questions arise. First, how much
of the risk tradeoff problem is already being solved by existing practices, and second, how much of the remaining problem can be solved by
increasing the amount of RTA employed by risk managers? In other
words, if RTA is already being performed in great amounts, and we
are already beginning to transform our attitudes toward risk-a transformation that may result in more RTA under existing practices-is there
really a great need for a comprehensive overhaul of the regulatory process? To be sure, the authors explicitly contend that current efforts are
inadequate and more RTA needs to be done. But, given the clear
signs that more and more RTA is being performed every day under the
current system and that a fundamental change in our risk management
paradigm is already under way, it is not altogether obvious that current
statutes, practices, and trends will fail to solve the tradeoff problem on
their own.
Similarly, given that some potential tradeoffs are so difficult (if not
impossible) to predict that no rational risk management system could
eliminate them, it is disappointing that the authors do not indicate the
limits of formal RTA for solving the tradeoff problem. In several
places, the authors do raise the so-called "perversity" thesis as a potential objection to RTA, but they reject it without much analysis and with
a perhaps over-optimistic faith in the possibilities of RTA."9 This is
particularly problematic, given the authors' own concession that the risk

88. See id. at 268-71.

89. See Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at 4 ("Our research indicates that risk tradeoffs
are not an imagined inevitable perversity of life but rather a real consequence of incomplete
decision-making, and that with attention and effort, individuals and society can wage the campaign to reduce risk with better tools that help to recognize and progressively reduce overall
risk."); Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 226 ("We believe that risk tradeoffs are prevalent

not because of an inescapable law of risk homeostasis, but because of systematic shortcomings
in the ways in which decisions are considered and structured.").
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tradeoff phenomenon is in part traceable to unpredictable human behavioral responses toward risk-particularly risk compensation behavior
patterns whereby people compensate for decreased risks (e.g., low tar
cigarettes) with behavior that will overcome the gains in safety caused
by the decrease (e.g., smoking more)."' These individual reactions
toward risk cannot be solved through improved risk management techniques.
Moreover, the authors may not recognize the ubiquity of these
unforeseeable and uncontrollable behavioral patterns.
In Edward
Tenner's recent book Why Things Bite Back- Technology and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences, the historian of science makes a
strong case in favor of one version of the perversity thesis. He canvasses a wide range of what he calls "revenge effects" and concludes
that the interaction of technology with the environment is so unpredictable and uncontrollable that rational risk management techniques are of
limited use in averting risk tradeoffs. 9 ' The crux of the problem is that
human culture, human behavior, technology, and the environment interact so unpredictably that no rational system can ever predict the results
of the interaction or solve for their unintended consequences-particularly in the long term. As Tenner eloquently notes in his conclusion:
[lt is extremely hard to predict the future state of a complex
system even without the added imponderables of human culture
and behavior. Well before climate became an issue, human
culture (including technology) set off bizarre chains of cause
and effect. The fashion for feathers and entire dead birds on
women's hats in the late nineteenth century devastated whole
species; but it also drew women and men into bird preservation
movements that outlived the fad. The early automobile spread
its own nemesis, the puncture weed with its tire-killing spiked
seedpods. Decades after safer and puncture-resistant tubeless
tires appeared, this technology unexpectedly abetted another
pest: the Asian tiger mosquito, a vector for dengue fever, which

90. See Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 241.
91. See EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND TH

REVEGE OF

UNrIENDED CONSEQuEN ES at x-xi (1996). It may, however, be unfair to characterize Tenner
as advocating perversity. He is in fact not a doomsayer. Though he does think that unintended consequences are inevitable, he believes that through extra vigilance and through ensuring
that the people responsible for wide-ranging change are affected by the unintended consequences
of change, we can reduce the harmful effects of these tradeoffs. See John Adams, Mistakes

Were Made, SCI. AM., Oct. 1996, at 120-22 (reviewing WHY TmNGS BrE BACK).
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traveled the Pacific in recycled tires and now enjoys an extended breeding season in water that collects in tire dumps. We
have already seen how cleaning up European harbors probably
helped spread tenacious zebra mussels to North America. Yet
motorization also helped reduce the population of European
sparrows.
Anyone correctly predicting these sequences well in advance
would have seemed a crank or an alarmist. In fact, most of
the greatest changes of the twentieth century simply did not
occur to the nineteenth-century imagination.92
Tenner's argument does not fatally undermine the importance or
feasibility of Graham and Wiener's position. Tenner may be wrong or,
more likely, his historical work may simply cast doubt on the idea that
RTA, or even a paradigmatic change in our national culture, can serve
as a panacea which will solve all tradeoff problems. But one wishes
that the authors had considered the perversity thesis in some depth and
conceded it at least in part. It seems self-evident that although some
risk tradeoffs are the result of mismanaged risk assessment procedures,
others are the result of forces which we may not be able to understand-much less predict-and these tradeoffs are likely to persist despite institutional change or paradigmatic cultural transformation.
II.

THE RISK TRADEOFFS OF RISK TRADEOFF ANALYSIS

More problematic than the authors' failure to consider the perversity
thesis or their ambiguous presentation of the need for RTA is their
reluctance to submit their own institutional proposals to a rigorous risk
tradeoff analysis. The authors persuasively argue that the legislative
and executive branches should only take action if they determine that
the benefits of the action will outweigh its costs. It is quite surprising,
therefore, that at several crucial points the authors suggest controversial
solutions to the current risk assessment system without either analyzing
these potential solutions from a critical perspective or closely evaluating
some of the obvious important potential objections to their proposals.
The precise contours of a successful RTA system cannot be appropriately delineated without such a critical analysis.

92. TENNER, supra note 91, at 271-72.
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A. Ripples
If it were costless for agencies to consider indefinitely the potential
risk tradeoffs of any particular action, an unlimited RTA scheme would
be in order-agencies could consider all potential risk tradeoffs regardless of their magnitude or probability. But, of course, the consideration
of potential risk tradeoffs is not costless; in fact, the costs can be quite
high.93 At some point, the costs of considering remote risks of decreasing importance will outweigh the benefits of weighing those risks.
Therefore, any sensible and workable risk assessment process which
proposes to solve the problem of risk tradeoffs must incorporate some
mechanism for deciding when to stop weighing risks. Those cases
where further investigation is warranted must be distinguished from
those where investigation becomes counterproductive. This may be the
most pressing problem facing those who wish to solve the tradeoff
problem. As Adam Finkel notes:
Net risk assessment, which would theoretically account for...
offsetting risks, is unfortunately an example of a refinement
where the need currently outstrips our capacity to deliver....
Even when such analyses are done quite carefully and appropriately . . . the fundamental problem of how to set the boundaries of the analysis plague attempts to confidently gauge net
94
impact.
The problem of setting appropriate boundaries can occur with tradeoffs as simple as those involved in a risk offset. Consider the issue of
regulating tobacco sales and advertising to children: Will decreasing advertising to children actually increase their tobacco use? Scenarios of
decreasing plausibility can easily be imagined. One possibility might
be that advertising cigarettes as a uniquely adult product might make
cigarettes seem more "cool" to kids. A perhaps less likely scenario
might be that with decreased advertising cigarette companies will be
able to lower the price of cigarettes, a result which may increase consumption in the price-sensitive youth market.

93. See Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 12, at 1552-53 ("Of course, the costs
of investigation and inquiry are never zero; on the contrary, they are often very high. We can
readily imagine that agencies could spend all their time investigating ancillary risks and never

do anything else-a disaster for regulatory policy.').
94. Finkel, supra note 5, at 323.
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Both of these scenarios seem worthy of investigation. But what of
less probable scenarios? Should the FDA consider the possibility that
decreased advertising may lull cigarette opponents into a false sense of
security, causing them to ease efforts to decrease smoking by kids and
spurring a long-term net increase in the amount of children who
smoke? How about the possibility that some anti-corporate kids might
be turned off by advertising? Should the FDA have to consider the
possibility that banning advertising might disassociate the product from
the company in the eyes of some children who may take up smoking
as a result? Probably not. But, in a system that cannot distinguish
between risks worth investigating and those which are not, it is unclear
whether agencies will be able to make intelligent decisions regarding
which risk tradeoff scenarios warrant consideration.
The problem becomes even more complex when either the adverse
outcome or the target population shifts. Should regulating agencies
really consider the possibility that increasing cigarette taxes could cause
parents to spend less money on necessities for their families?" Might
decreasing cigarette advertising cause kids to shift to more dangerous
drugs (or will it decrease such shifts since perhaps cigarette smoking
leads to using more dangerous drugs)? Along the same lines, decreasing smoking might result in net harmful effects to the health of certain
individuals because of risk compensating behavior. One could imagine
that for certain people, smoking fills a danger-seeking niche which
might be replaced with a more dangerous activity-perhaps driving
faster or even acting violently. Should regulating agencies be required
to consider all such possibilities, and if they should, how much consideration should each possibility receive?
And what of the cigarette industry's overseas shift? Should federal
regulators consider the intemational effects of decreasing domestic
smoking? If the result is that a million people in the United States
live and a million people in China die, has a recognizable risk transfer
occurred? If so, what if moving operations abroad in fact increases
employment, economic growth, and at least short-term quality of life
abroad? Should this be weighed against the health risks? What if
increased economic growth causes better hygiene and medical facilities
which improves short-term health? Does this offset the increased
health risks from smoking? But then again, what if exporting western
products and technology destroys indigenous culture as a by-product of

95. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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economic growth? One can hypothesize possibilities indefinitely. The
key to a successful risk tradeoff assessment program is to limit the
analysis to those potential tradeoffs that might reasonably undermine
regulatory goals.
Unfortunately, the authors of Risk versus Risk do not consider this
fundamental problem in much depth. They certainly recognize the
problem. The authors realize that there will be some cases where analysis of a potential risk will yield more costs than benefits, and they
urge decisionmakers to focus on the largest, most significant "ripples." '
They argue that by front-loading analysis of countervailing risks to the
pre-decision stage, RTA produces efficiency gains over a system which
only considers such risks when their victims bring claims long after the
decisions have been made.97 But the authors do not appear overly concemed with the issue of how decisionmakers will distinguish between
those countervailing risks which are worth analyzing and those which
are not. They are confident that decisionmakers can make these distinctions without much guidance. Moreover, the authors argue that the
problem of countervailing risks is so pervasive that rejecting RTA on
the grounds that it might return more costs than benefits would be
perverse. As the authors note:
[The challenge remains one of weighing not only risk versus
risk, but also the value versus the costs of learning. In the
present situation, where countervailing risks are plentiful but
appear to be so often ignored, rejecting RTA on this ground
would be like worrying about whether to slide at home plate
while still standing on first base. We are starting with the first,
nearest and biggest ripples.9"
The question, however, is not whether RTA should be used or
not-the authors make an extremely persuasive case that RTA must be
used-but rather what kind of RTA should be used. Despite the authors' confidence that the ripple problem will not prove insurmountable,
the institutional proposals they advance do not include safeguards to
ensure that agencies weigh only cost-effective risks. Agencies, as the
authors deftly point out, are not inherently geared toward intelligently
weighing countervailing risks. Thus, there is little reason to be confident that merely amending a statute or an Executive Order will result
96. See Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at 20-22.
97. See id at 21.
98. IM at 22.
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in agencies automatically becoming expert at making such important
distinctions. Moreover, the combination of a vague "we know an important countervailing risk when we see it" definition of an important
countervailing risk with a broadening of judicial review is certainly
problematic. If agencies have no concrete guidelines for determining
when to weigh a potential countervailing risk, and they know that
courts will be taking a hard look at their risk tradeoff analysis process,
the agencies will likely err on the side of investigating too much rather
than too little. This could easily result in an inefficient system that
reaps more costs than benefits.
For this reason, the authors' failure to provide more concrete guidelines to agencies and courts for distinguishing between countervailing
risks is problematic. Of course, devising these guidelines is itself an
enterprise fraught with danger because of circularity problems. As
Sunstein notes, "it is impossible to know whether to undertake healthhealth analysis without first doing a bit of health-health analysis, at
least by making some initial judgments about the ancillary risk-a risk
'
Nonetheless,
that, by hypothesis, the agency has not yet explored."99
standards such as those proposed by Sunstein may still be a good start.
Before deciding whether to investigate countervailing risks, the agency
(perhaps in some initial report of limited scope) should consider the
costs of delay, the information costs of investigating the countervailing
risk, and the potential benefits of investigation.' 0 These may seem like
obvious factors-and they are-but making them explicit will at least
provide agencies with a general framework for determining when to go
ahead and weigh countervailing risks. More importantly, they will
provide a legal standard which agencies can use in front of courts to
justify their decision not to weigh a particular risk-a standard which
might enable agencies to feel confident that they can ignore a remote
or unimportant risk without ultimately being subjected to harsh judicial
review. This would be particularly true if the standard also provided
that an agency should only proceed to consider the countervailing risk
if the three factors militate heavily in favor of weighing the risk-a
standard which would be consistent with the authors' interest in starting
with the biggest and nearest ripples. The existence of such a formal
standard would certainly increase the chances that a broad-based RTA
program would be net-beneficial. It is for this important reason that

99. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 12, at 1553.

100. See id.
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one wishes the authors had developed such a standard to guide agencies
and courts in implementing RTA.
B. Values
As was noted earlier, the authors do a particularly impressive job of
emphasizing the importance of value-based decision-making in the RTA
process.' ' Weighing risks certainly does require some objectivet"e
comparison of potential outcomes in terms of economic cost and projected lives saved.'0 3 To this end, the authors propose that risk managers consider such objective variables as the magnitude and probability
of the risk, the size of the affected population, and the certainty of
proposed risk estimates.'
Consideration of these factors can sometimes be sufficient for deciding among risks. For example, in a
straight risk offset, 0 5 consideration of objective factors such as the
probability of a risk offset and a comparison of the magnitude of the
risk both pre- and post-regulation will ordinarily suffice to determine
whether action should be taken. 06 However, as the authors point out,
there are numerous situations where consideration of objective factors
alone will not be adequate. Risk comparison almost always involves
value-laden decision-making. This, in turn, requires some mechanism
for allowing public opinion to penetrate and influence the risk management process. Unfortunately, though the authors recognize the importance of public opinion, their institutional proposals fail to ensure that
the process will become more democratic and that laypeople will be
able to make their voices heard.
There are at least two broad categories of tradeoff scenarios where
public opinion is necessary for forming responsible risk management

101. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
102. I use "objective" here in a loose manner with full recognition that comparing numerical
data can never be completely value-free.

103. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 1, at 24-27 (listing various regulations and their baseline
mortality risk per million people exposed as well as their cost per premature death averted);
B.T. Mossman et al., Asbestos: Scientific Developments and Implicationsfor Public Polcy. 247

SCIENCE 294, 299 (1990) (comparing annual deaths per million of asbestos exposure in schools
to other risks such as drowning, long-term smoking, and airplane accidents).
104. See Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at 29-32.

105. Defined as a risk tradeoff where a regulation aimed at reducing one risk actually imposes the same risk on the same population through a different route. For a summary of the
authors' risk tradeoff typology, see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying texL
106. However, if, for example, the pre-regulation risk is incurred voluntarily but the postregulation risk is not, then subjective factors will need to be considered even in this situation.
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solutions. First, some risk tradeoffs involve shifting the nature of the
adverse outcome, and these situations require that risk managers account for laypeople's perceptions of risk. Laypeople fear certain risks,
such as uncontrollable and unfamiliar ones, more than others."0 7 People
also fear cancer, which they judge to be a very painful way to die,
more than other health risks, such as heart disease. 08 Second, some
risk tradeoffs involve shifting risks among different populations, and
require risk managers to account for people's opinions regarding matters of distributional justice. Should risks be shifted overseas? To less
affluent populations? To future generations? These are issues on
which expert risk managers possess no special expertise. The authors
recognize that these profound ethical issues require risk managers to
make decisions informed by democratic processes. 0 9 Only through a
long-term "scientific and ethical dialogue"" can society resolve these
important issues.
Unfortunately, however, our current risk management system is not
democratic."' Despite a few examples to the contrary," 2 laypeople are
generally excluded from the risk assessment process, and their opinions
are largely ignored by risk managers. The process is enveloped in
secrecy, and nonexperts provide little input into the many crucial decisions made every day by administrative decisionmakers. This lack of
popular access to the process severely undermines both the efficacy and
legitimacy of the regulatory system. As Pildes and Sunstein write:
The modem regulatory state should also be more democratic.
Currently, regulation is far too inaccessible to public control.
Instead, it is enshrouded in technocratic complexities not subject
to public debate, affected by misleading, sensationalist anecdotes, or, even worse, subject to the influence of well-organized
private groups with personal stakes in the outcome. A range of
improvements could make the democratic process work better.
The key task for those interested in regulatory performance is

107. See supra notes 80-81.
108. See Anderson & Wiener, supra note 25, at 118.

109. See Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at 33-36; Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at
233.
110. Graham & Wiener, supra note 15, at 33-36.
111. See Fiorino, supra note 2, at 501 ("This article argues that our thinking, research, and
experience are lagging badly behind the demands that environmental risk policymaking presents

in a democratic society.").
H2. See id.at 539-43 (describing examples where democratic participation in the regulatory
process was successfully achieved); Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 89-94.
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to find wayst3of simultaneously promoting economic and democratic goals.
Unfortunately, the authors of Risk versus Risk do not propose institutional reforms to improve the democratic functioning of the administrative state. Although the authors agree that regulatory decision-making must be informed by popular opinion, they fail to create any satisfactory mechanism to allow that opinion into the process. They make
only one suggestion in this regard, proposing that "[a]gencies and subagencies should at least identify, consider, and publicize the effects of
their policies on other (countervailing) risks."" 4 This requirement

would notify the potential victims of countervailing risks so they could
mobilize quickly enough to influence policy choices." 5 This is certainly a good start, but it does not go far enough.
There are several problems with only providing this type of participatory avenue. First, it assumes that the affected population has the
resources to mobilize. Political participation is not costless, and many
have neither the time nor money to respond to proposed rulemakings." 6

Second, it ignores the fact that a large population with a clear but
weak interest rarely has the will to mobilize. More people may fear
cancer more than heart disease, but it is unlikely that anyone would

mobilize to stop an action that would substitute a risk of cancer for
heart disease in an identical population.

Third, and most importantly,

the authors' proposal continues to make laypeople reactive participants
in the regulatory system rather than involving them in the decisionmaking process during its initial stages. Laypeople continue to have no
direct say in the initial formulation of regulatory policy but are instead

113. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 8.
114. Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 255-56.
115. See id at 256.
116. The authors recognize this fact in other places in the book. See Williams & Graham,
supra, note 59, at 86 ("The objections of politically active, organized senior citizens to the
countervailing risks of age-based license restrictions ifiay have been sufficiently influential to
block such policies. But ifthe elderly were not so politically active, wvould the countervailing
risks be taken so seriously?"); Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 230-33 (describing the
omitted voice problem). It is unclear how the authors propose to solve the omitted voice
problem beyond trying to inform more people of countervailing risks-a strategy that will not
work unless the pertinent population has the resources to mobilize. The authors do propose
broadening standing to deal with the problem, but this also assumes that the population can
mobilize to bring a lawsuit. Moreover, the time for participation has passed if the situation
has already reached litigation. In addition, to the extent that agencies know that traditionallyexcluded populations will not be able to mobilize to bring a lawsuit, agencies will likely not
be deterred from taking action which will adversely affect these populations.
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relegated to having to mobilize against an already proposed solution.
The proposal therefore emphasizes confrontation over participatory democracy. Fiorino's description of the current system also captures the
problems with the authors' proposals:
Often participation is equated with opposition. The public is
placed in a reactive posture: comments are noted, views are
heard, opportunities are presented. But we rarely see a sharing
of power or the codetermination of policy. The process concedes a marginal role to the individual citizen. Genuine influence is granted reluctantly, minimally, and to interests with the
capacity to obstruct decisions later." 7
Of course, devising proposals to increase true democratic participation in the regulatory process is quite difficult. Involving laypeople in
scientific decision-making is not easy, particularly given the uncertainties of science itself and the difficulty of communicating scientific
ideas. Agencies are neither set up nor predisposed to welcome public
voices." 8 But steps must be taken. Institutional mechanisms, such as
science courts 9 or lay juries, 2 ' that directly involve laypeople in the
initial decision-making process seem to be particularly promising. Evidence suggests that such citizen panels and discussion groups can successfully facilitate the exchange of expert and lay understandings of
risk, and can promote publicly informed risk management decisions.'
Without such mechanisms, the system will continue to fail to produce
democratically sensitive solutions. Because the authors fail to provide
for such mechanisms, the RTA system they propose may not be able to
handle the critical ethical issues which are central to any democratically
responsible risk assessment program.
C. Courts
As the authors themselves recognize, broadening judicial review of
agency action is not costless. When arguing in favor of extending
standing to those affected by countervailing risks, the authors raise the

117. Fiorino, supra note 2, at 529.
118. See id. at 543-44.
119. See, e.g., K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK ANALYSIS AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD: METHODOLOGICAL
AND ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH EVALUATING SOCIETAL HAZARDS 197 (1985).
120. See, e.g., Harvey Brooks, The Resolution of Technically Intensive Public Policy Disputes,

9 Scd., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 39, 40 (1984).
121. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 75, 91.
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possibility that encouraging litigation might in fact lead to more costs
than benefits: ". . . more lawsuits can be dysfunctional: litigation directed at administrative agencies can add more to paralysis and to
rulemaking costs (and thereby discourage public rulemaking as a policy
'
vehicle) than it improves the prospect for intelligent decisions. 12
After raising this possibility, the authors simply move on. They apparently assume that despite the increased costs in terms of delay, transaction costs from litigation, and potential paralysis, reforming the rules
governing judicial review of agency action is nonetheless worthwhile.
It is unfortunate that the authors did not pause to consider this
possibility at greater length. The mere threat of judicial review leads
agencies to adopt cumbersome procedures for adopting and changing
rules-which in turn slows down the pace of rulemaking and can even
halt the process entirely.'
It produces enormous transaction costs in
the form of agency workload, increased lawyers' fees, and additional
remands. 24 Given that courts have limited expertise in reviewing the
substantive decision-making of administrative agencies,"z the risk of
increased costs should make reformers reluctant to broaden judicial
review far beyond its current role. The authors do not seriously consider this argument, however, and this hurts their ability to persuasively
justify their proposed reforms of administrative law doctrine.
There are two broad initial problems. First, if the executive and
legislative branches make the reforms suggested by the authors, the
judicial reforms become largely superfluous. Under current law, courts
must overturn agency actions that conflict with the plain meaning of

122. Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 266.

123. See BREYER, supra note I, at 49 ("Mhe very threat of judicial review has led agencies
to adopt complex, time-consuming procedures both for making rules and changing them. The
result is an agency that will sometimes hesitate to make rules or to change them once adopted;
consequently, rules become frozen in place and cannot readily adapt to changing scientific
knowledge.").
124. See Ronald Levin, Judicial Review of Procedural Compliance, 48 ADmfm. L REv. 359,
362 (1996); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review Talking Points, 48 ADMIN. L REv. 350. 352-

53 (1996).
125. See Wald, supra note 125, at 352-53 ("Related questions have been raised about vhether

we in the courts are competent to review the minutiae of risk or cost-benefit analysis. For
most of us, the answer is no. . . . The courts have been perceived as the enemy of efficient
regulation for so long-when deregulation began in the early '80s, they said we rained on the

deregulators parade. Conservatives especially railed at us for trying to take over executive
decisionmaking functions. Vermont Yankee and Chevron and Cheney seemed to reflect that fear
of undue court interference with agency discretion."); Wiener & Graham. supra note 24. at 260
("The courts have not, however, been a reliable source of leadership for more intelligent management of society's risk portfolio.").

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:225

administrative statutes.'26 If Congress amended statutes to explicitly
require RTA, and agencies still failed to perform RTA, courts would
have no choice but to remand the challenged rule back to the agency.
There would be no need to change the current scope of judicial review.
Second, if the statutes stay the same and courts interpret terms like
"reasonable" or "arbitrary" as requiring agencies to perform RTA, they
would in fact be decreasing the amount of deference afforded by courts
to agencies. As the Supreme Court held in Chevron v. N.R.D.C., agencies have great discretion and flexibility in interpreting ambiguous statutes.'27 Thus, it is clear that under the current system, if the statute
does not expressly require an agency to consider countervailing risks,
courts are not likely to characterize an agency's failure to do so as
unreasonable or arbitrary. This change is of course what the authors
are looking for, but it is the kind of change that risks the increased
costs discussed above. This is particularly true because the precedent is
unlikely to remain limited to tradeoff scenarios. A holding decreasing
deference in one area risks reversing the overarching trend toward a
decreased judicial role in reviewing agency action, which could exacer28
bate the costs over the entire system.
The vagueness of the authors' proposals enhance these problems.
They are ambiguous for two reasons. First, it is unclear which risks
courts should require agencies to consider. This is a variant of the
ripples issue discussed above. The authors argue that agency action
should be held arbitrary and capricious if it ignores "important" coun-

126. See Chevron v. N.ILD.C., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
127. See id. at 842-45 (courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutory language). See also Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 12, at 1564 ("As
we have seen, many statutes do not require agencies to consider ancillary risks. In any case,

courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes, so in many instances the agency
will have the authority to decide whether to consider ancillary risks. If the agency has the
statutory authority not to consider ancillary risks, it is unlikely, under current law, to be held

that its decision not to do so was arbitrary.").

But see Competitive Enter. Inst. v. NHTSA,

(CEI), 956 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (agency failure to adequately account for countervailing

risks required remand for a better explanation of policy change).

Even CEI, however, noted

that although the agency could not make conclusory assertions to the effect that increasing fuel
standards would not decrease traffic safety by decreasing car size, it probably could have "concluded that the statute does not require it to consider safety effects when deciding whether to
embark on a modification proceeding" because "the statutory framework is so loose and defer-

ence under [Chevron] so broad that the agency would have had a fair shot at being upheld."
Id. at 323.
128. See Wald, supra note 124, at 353 (proposals to increase judicial review risk reversing
the trend established by Vermont Yankee and Chevron and "enhanc[ing] the role of the courts
vis-a-vis the agencies, something free marketeers have been excoriating for several decades").
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tervailing risks,'2 9 but the authors never define the meaning of "important." Is the risk of causing a false sense of security among tobacco
industry opponents an important countervailing risk? How about the
risk that an increased American corporate presence abroad might undermine native culture by promoting economic growth?
Second, the authors do not indicate the extent to which agencies
must consider these important countervailing risks. The authors cite the
pathbreaking case of Competitive EnterpriseInstitute v. NHTSAI30 (CEI)
for the proposition that agencies act arbitrarily when they ignore countervailing risks. However, the key debate in CEI between Judge Williams' majority opinion and Judge Mikva's dissenting opinion was not
over the issue of whether the agency had to consider such risks, but
over the extent to which they have to consider and justify their conclusions regarding the risks.
The basic issues in CEI were (1) whether the NHTSA was required
to consider the possibility that its proposed decision to increase fuel
efficiency standards would cause automobile manufacturers to produce
smaller cars, thereby resulting in a net decrease in traffic safety, and
(2) if so, how the agency could fulfill its burden to consider this possibility. Judge Williams held that NHTSA had an obligation to consider
countervailing risks, and that the agency's conclusory assertions did not
suffice to meet its burden.'
In dissent, Judge Mikva assumed that the
agency had to consider countervailing risks. However, he concluded
that it had done so, pointing to the fact that the agency had addressed
safety-related comments raised by opponents of the rulemaking and had
expressly concluded that "there is no evidence demonstrating adverse
safety consequences that would be associated with retaining the [new
standard]."' 32 Judge Mikva criticized the majority for "intrud[ing] into
the agency's domain by substituting a judicial balancing of the evidence
for NHTSA's own considered judgment."'3
Graham and Wiener seem ambivalent about the amount of scrutiny
which courts should apply to agency action. On the one hand, they
cite the majority opinion with approval and suggest that courts should
"instill in agencies diligent attention to risk tradeoffs."' 4 On the other

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 262.
956 F.2d 321 (1992).
See id at 327.
Id. at 327-28 (citing 1989 Fed. Reg. 21,992-94).
Id at 327.
Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 263.
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hand, their position that "[t]he court would not be required to judge the
substantive reasonableness of the agency's conclusion, only to ensure
that the agency confronted the risk tradeoff' ' 35 suggests that they agree
with Judge Mikva and would in fact not have supported the actual
result in CEI Ultimately, it is not clear whether the authors think
courts should require agencies to merely consider risk tradeoffs or
whether they should demand that agencies consider risk tradeoffs in
great detail and present extremely persuasive evidence in support of
their final regulatory choice.
This vagueness is important because it inevitably increases the costs
of regulation. An agency which does not know whether or to what
extent it is required to consider a particular risk will most likely be
overcautious-considering more risks than necessary and considering
them in more detail than it ideally should have to. The vagueness,
combined with the broadening of the scope of review, may create costs
that would outweigh any benefits gained by having agencies considering
countervailing risks. It is also quite possible that the benefits would far
exceed the costs. We simply do not know, and the authors' failure to
analyze this fundamental question in much detail detracts from the
presentation of their case.
Two steps could greatly alleviate our concerns. First, the authors
should answer the two uncertain questions ("which risks?" and "how
much consideration?") conservatively. This would decrease costs while
remaining faithful to the authors' dual desires of limiting analysis to
the biggest ripples and restraining agencies from considering the substantive reasonableness of agencies' conclusions. Second, the authors
should provide clearer standards to guide agencies and courts in determining how far agencies must go.'36 Of course, placing strict limits on
judicial review will allow some questionable agency decision-making to
go unchallenged, but given the enormous costs of judicial review and
the inherent incapacity of courts to independently assess the costs and
benefits of risk management decisions, limiting review through clear
standards will almost certainly ensure that the benefits of RTA will
outweigh its costs. Otherwise, as the proposals currently stand, one
cannot be so sure.

135. Id. at 262.
136. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
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Ill.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the authors of Risk versus Risk have presented a highly
persuasive case that agencies should employ more risk tradeoff analysis
than they currently do, and they propose ambitious yet workable proposals to jumpstart the process. Nevertheless, in their present form,
these proposals might in fact produce more costs than benefits. In
certain places the authors fail to provide clear standards to guide agencies and courts, and they do not provide for institutional mechanisms to
ensure democratically legitimate decision-making. However, these problems are by no means fatal. The core of the authors' proposals are
eminently sound and demand attention from those who wish to reform
our nation's regulatory strategy toward risk.
If legislators take up Graham and Wiener's suggestions, they should
provide agencies and courts with clear guidelines for determining which
risks they must consider and to what extent they must consider them.
At first, legislators should aim conservatively. To reduce the costs of
reform, legislators should formulate explicit standards to ensure that
agencies consider only the most important countervailing risks. Moreover, courts should not be required to overturn agency action that considers such risks but fails to provide overly detailed justifications for
ignoring them. Finally, reformers should develop mechanisms for involving laypeople in the initial stages of regulatory policymaking so
that they can provide input on the critical questions of risk perception
and distributive justice which are so omnipresent in the regulatory state.
If reformers keep these caveats in mind, then Graham and Wiener's
compelling case for increasing RTA will surely improve our nation's
campaign to decrease overall risk.

